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Abstract 
This exploratory paper examines the concept of diversity as a dynamic of board effectiveness. The study argues that 
diversity hardly works without putting in place systems and programmes that promote social inclusion, and, as such, 
research on board diversity must account for this element in building empirical frameworks and model specifications. 
The study finds that a great majority of previous studies have ignored this variable of significant importance and, in 
some instances, conflated it with diversity itself. This represents a material flaw that needs to be addressed. This paper 
offers guidance on how to measure and account for social inclusion and integration in board diversity research. Finally, 
a portfolio efficiency frontier model is proposed as a mechanism for differentiating between corporations with efficient 
board diversity and those that are tokenism based.  
Keywords: board diversity, tokenism, social inclusion, corporations, efficiency frontier model 
1. Introduction 
Diversity is not a new topic when it comes to workplace dynamics, especially in developed economies. The concept 
originally focused on addressing social injustice and promoting equal opportunities for racial minorities and people of 
colour in the white-dominated workforce (Bursell & Jansson, 2018; Jayne & Dipboye, 2004; Rhode & Packel, 2014). 
Diversity, then, was more of a social integration movement based on moral suasion, with corporations at liberty to 
design the manner and rate at which they achieved social inclusion without jeopardising shareholder value.  
In contrast, the recent resurgence of the subject of diversity in the workplace can be attributed to two types of critical 
events: business scandals at highly respected corporations and anti-sexism actions. First, the collapse of global giants, 
such as Enron and WorldCom, has turned public attention to corporate boards and the effectiveness of directors in the 
discharge of their statutory obligations, which include executive monitoring, control, advising and oversight (Francis, 
Hasan, & Wu, 2015; Singh, Terjesen, & Vinnicombe, 2008). Reported cases of corporate scandals and the fallout from 
these events – loss of shareholders‟ funds, jobs and tax revenues – have demonstrated the far-reaching impact the 
decisions of boards of directors have on stakeholders‟ and societal wellbeing (Rhode & Packel, 2014).  
Second, the anti-sexism movement has equally fuelled discussions about diversity in the top corporate echelon. Unlike 
the traditional focus, current quests for diversity in the workplace are gender skewed, with the primary goal being more 
female involvement in strategic business decision making and corporate policy ratification (Farrell & Hersch, 2005). So 
far, women advocacy movements have gained tremendous support from regulators and policymakers worldwide, with 
mounting pressure on corporations to move from what has been perceived to be an “old boys club” style of board 
structure to a heterogeneous formation with more female directors. Some jurisdictions have even gone beyond making 
simple code recommendations by imposing a gender quota system that has forced corporations to zone a certain 
proportion of directorship positions to women (Adams, Haan, Terjesen, & Ees, 2015; Zhang, 2012).  
Interestingly, though there are presumed benefits associated with the involvement of women in boardroom, concerns 
have been raised over forced involvement, including the adoption of binding quota systems and timelines for when 
corporations should diversify, which some have claimed may be counterproductive (Harjotoa, Laksmanab & Yangc, 
2018; Riordan, 2020; Sherbin & Rashid, 2017). The proponents of this business rationale have argued that individual 
cognitive competence and resource dependency should take precedence over gender configuration (Bernilea, Bhagwatg 
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& Yonkerc, 2018; Campell & Mίnguez-Vera, 2008; Dalton & Dalton, 2010; Pathan & Faff, 2013). Therefore, the issue 
of gender parity is not the only variable of diversity under scrutiny; determining the appropriate number of experts with 
the required cognitive experience has also generated a great deal of debate in corporate governance literature.  
However, notwithstanding the growing popularity of corporate scandals and the need to discuss gender and cognitive 
diversity in board dynamics and their intended benefits, there is little empirical validation of the relevance of these 
diversity dimensions in firm governance. Prior studies have reported equivocal results, which has created some doubts 
regarding the strategic importance of diversity to board effectiveness and overall corporate performance. 
Here, it is argued that board diversity has merit and that the only missing piece in magnifying its merit empirically is 
called “inclusion”. The majority of previous studies have either ignored this significant variable or, in some instances, 
have simply conflated it with diversity itself, which is inaccurate (Farndale, Biron, Briscoe, & Raghuram, 2015; 
Fitzsimmons, 2012). This omission represents a material flaw in model specification and needs to be addressed. In this 
study, the validity of an isolationist approach to the study of board diversity as whole is challenged, particularly where 
cognitive and demographic elements are seen as standalone variables. It is argued that these variables are not in 
competition, but rather are integrated and complementary, and thus should not be separated when building a 
comprehensive definition of diversity for empirical purposes. 
This paper is motivated by the need to offer additional research direction on the essence of diversity and the variables that 
may justify inclusive business practices and make a case for board diversity at the corporate level. Understanding the 
chronology of board diversity would help sharpen future research on what to watch for and where to look when exploring 
any correlations between board diversity and firm performance. Such description is vital, especially given the 
equivocality that has dominated prior studies, with many relying on non-cognitive variables, such as the main driver of 
board effectiveness, without recourse to the socioeconomic environment within which corporations operate (Lauring & 
Villeseche, 2017; Rhode & Packel, 2014). Using a portfolio efficiency frontier model, this paper adds insight into how 
over diversification through forced policy exposition can erode the benefits of board diversity in corporate governance.  
The remaining sections of this paper are organised as follows: Section two is focused on the conceptual justification for 
board diversity and its associated benefits. Section three reviews key empirical studies and explores how far the 
documented evidence from prior research has supported (or disputed) the notion of board diversity and its relevance in 
firm governance. In section four, the paper highlights the bandwagon effects of rigid diversity policies and code 
recommendations on board effectiveness and makes a case for the implementation of social inclusion programmes and 
policies by corporations to help address tokenism syndrome, as well as for the adoption of a portfolio efficiency model in 
diversity research. Section five offers directions for future research and recommendations for policymakers. 
2. Rationale for Diversity in Board Composition 
The board of directors is the most widely studied aspect of corporate governance (Bernilea et al., 2018; Byron & Post, 
2016; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Gray & Nowland, 2017; Hillman, 2015; kang, Cheng, & Gray, 2007; Nielsen 
& Huse, 2010). Directors perform numerous agency and resource dependence facilitations (e.g. monitoring and resource 
mobilisation) to mitigate the inherent risk of separation of ownership and control, which has caused shareholders billions 
of dollars in loss of investments and revenue. As a result, understanding bifurcate interplays of board dynamics is crucial 
in the selection and adoption of an internal governance mechanism. Over the years, experts and public commentators have 
turned their attention to the structure of the board and the characteristics that can endanger members‟ ability to discharge 
duties effectively (Kang et al., 2007). Issues of board size, independence, and separation of power have been well 
documented in the corporate governance literature. However, many have still argued that board composition should 
reflect the cosmopolitan nature of modern corporations and business operations. Van der Walt and Ingley (2003) argue 
that corporations face multifaceted challenges due to the growing complexity of businesses and environments, which, in 
turn, requires a diverse and talented workforce that can break through these external barriers. Having directors from 
diverse backgrounds promotes board oversight and hence the quality of deliberations at board meetings. For instance, Gul, 
Srinidhi & Ng (2011) contend that diversity can help boards reduce information asymmetries. They found compelling 
empirical evidence that suggests diversity facilitates intelligence gathering, even in firms with poor earnings quality. 
Interestingly, debates on corporate diversity have been anchored on two exciting dimensions: demographic and cognitive. 
The demographic dimension (e.g. age, race, and gender) has received more attention, with increased calls for women‟s 
participation in corporate decision making. The reason for this is that a significant portion of the directors prosecuted in 
the aftermath of high-profile corporate scandals were white males, and there was no female or racial minority involvement. 
Using the collapse of Enron as a case study, some critics have highlighted the lack of gender diversity as a crucial factor 
that led to the reported scandal. Because women are mostly risk-averse, Loukil and Yousif (2016) opine that their 
presence in the boardroom reduces corporate risk taking, unlike their male counterparts, who are often associated with 
high-risk investments. 
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While some diversity experts have voiced the need to balance gender-related demands with cognitive rationales, 
advocates of these dimensions have continued to offer compelling justifications for the strategic importance of diversity in 
promoting board effectiveness. Harjotoa et al. (2018) argue that the degree of directors‟ heterogeneity affects a board‟s 
ability to carry out agency and resource dependency roles effectively. Advocates of board diversification have cited some 
presumed benefits associated with heterogeneous boards, including effective decision making, optimisation of corporate 
talent, and improved reputation. Slater, Weigand & Zwirlein (2008) argue that deliberations in an efficiently diversified 
board are based on a broader perspective. Directors from different backgrounds create a pool of knowledge, capabilities 
and viewpoints that facilitate the attainment of corporate objectives. By tapping into the vast ideas that diversity of 
opinion creates, corporate boards can de-risk not only the likely passiveness of the board itself but also mitigate the 
inherent self-interest of CEOs and executive entrenchment. This represents the business rationale for diversity that has 
motivated more corporations to seek variety in human capital across the multicultural spectrum. When it comes resource 
dependency, a diversified board of directors provides a more efficient vehicle for linking corporations with the resources 
they need to facilitate value creation for shareholders (Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). Dalton and Dalton (2010) assert that 
external members bring to bear not only fresh ideas but also significant network connections for effective boundary 
spanning, which links corporations with required resources. Directors with social networks are very active in gathering 
intelligence and in helping corporations cushion the effects of adverse changes in market conditions (Rivas, 2012). 
It is worth noting that regardless of the dimension, diversity in board membership represents a double-edged sword of 
presumed benefits and inherent costs for adopting firms. Members of diverse boards bring different and distinctive 
perspectives to the boardroom, which facilitates board oversight of corporate executives (Adams et al., 2015). The flip 
side to this, however, includes the fact that highly diversified boards often lack a sense of urgency and are more likely to 
spend more time arriving at strategic decisions due to cognitive and/or demographics-related conflicts. Therefore, while 
board diversity can be beneficial, it comes at a cost. Hence, corporations must evaluate these costs in light of accrued 
benefits to determine whether it is economical to pursue board diversity. Apart from the fundamental belief that some 
board diversities are tokenism based, issues such as role conflicts, stereotyping, split-factions and silo mentalities are 
some factors cited as likely to jeopardise board effectiveness and, by extension, erode the benefits of board diversity 
(Rhode & Packel, 2014; Slater et al., 2008). 
3. Facts and Fiction of Board Diversity: Review of Empirical Evidence 
Despite the growing attention paid to board diversity across many jurisdictions, researchers have found it difficult to 
empirically validate the persuasive justifications put forward in the public domain and those cited from the policymakers‟ 
standpoint. In this section, the paper will review prior research and highlight the inconsistencies that have dominated 
empirical evidence, especially from studies that magnify the importance of diversity in firm governance. First, the study 
reviews findings from the demographic dimension of gender, which has received the most research interest. Female 
directors are presumed to be able to multitask, have great interpersonal skills and be meticulous, which mitigates potential 
CEO entrenchment (Fitzsimmons, 2012). Gender diversity has also been linked to specific task performance, such as 
sustainable supply chain responsibility (Benjamin, Mansi, & Pandey, 2019); cost of debt (Pandey, Biswas, Ali, & Mansi, 
2029); audit quality (Lai, Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2017); social performance (Byron & Post, 2016); corporate reputation 
(Chen, Gramlich, & Houser, 2019); shareholder activism (Marquardt & Wiedman, 2016); corporate risk taking (Bernilea 
et al., 2018) and dividend pay-out (Byoun, Chang & Kim, 2016). Yet, results from numerous studies on the impact of 
gender diversity on overall corporate financial and market value have been highly equivocal. Huctchinson, Mack, & 
Plastow (2015), in a study of 500 listed Australian corporations, reported a positive correlation between gender diversity 
and financial performance in the face of reduced excessive risk taking. This finding was consistent with those reported in 
Vafaei, Ahmed, and Mather (2015), Ararat, Aksu & Cetin (2015) and Erhardt et al. (2003). In contrast, in one of the most 
famous board demographic studies, Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson (2010) found no significant relationship 
between women and ethnic minority directors and corporate performance. As a matter of fact, the finding was 
distinctively consistent with results from countries with advanced gender parity support policies (Marinova, Plantenga & 
Remery, 2016; Rose, 2007; Veltrop et al., 2015). For instance, Veltrop et al. (2015), in a study of 318 boards of Dutch 
Pension Fund firms, indicate that demographic diversity activates “fault lines” that impair cohesion among board 
members. Adams and Ferreira (2009) attribute this inverse relationship to the counterproductive impact of a mandatory 
gender quota system on corporations. Nielsen and Huse (2010) go a step further, finding no empirical evidence to 
suggest that the involvement of female directors provoked open debate or enhanced the quality of deliberation in 
boardrooms. 
Cognitive diversity has not been spared from similar empirical inconsistencies. Bernilea et al. (2018) argue that a 
director‟s cognitive characteristics are the most relevant dimension, given that corporate survival is dependent on the 
delivery of a profitable performance. However, despite the business case for diversity, findings of studies that have 
investigated the relevance of cognitive characteristics, such as educational qualifications, expertise and tenure, have also 
lacked consistency. In a longitudinal study, Tan and Sen (2019) find a positive association between educational 
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qualifications and directors‟ specialties and the performance of U.S. equity funds. Harjota et al. (2018) report similar 
findings in their study of 1,898 firms between 1998 and 2014. They also find that cognitively diversified boards provide 
better strategic oversight on investment risks. Their findings are interesting because they validate earlier research. For 
instance, Barroso-Castro, Villegas-Periñnan, & Dominguez (2017), in a study of 200 big Spanish companies, find that 
directors‟ cognitive capabilities play a strategic role in their involvement in corporate board decision making. However, in 
a single empirical study, Kim and Lim (2010) find both a positive and a negative relationship between educational 
qualifications and firm value. While they report a positive association between academic specialisation and firm value, 
they find a negative connection between accounting qualifications and firm valuation, which is inconsistent, given that the 
accounting profession represents another field academic specialisation, just like others. Almondoz and Tilcsik (2016) 
study 1,300 community banks over a 17-year period and observe that banks with industry-expert-dominant directors are 
more likely to experience corporate failure due to high risk of cognitive entrenchment, overconfidence and task conflicts 
among members.  
Regardless of which diversity dimensions are examined, a significant number of prior studies fail to reach a consensus. 
These inconsistencies have cast doubt on our understanding of diversity dynamics and their overall application in 
corporate governance. Hillman (2015) opines that as more questions related to the strategic relevance of board diversity 
are answered, new ones spring up at astronomical speed. In our review of prior studies, we observed a fundamental flaw in 
the translation of “diversity” as a concept and its application in the study of boards of directors. Unlike other board 
characteristics (such as size, composition and CEO duality), which are easily comprehensible and adaptable, diversity is a 
complex dynamic. Sherban and Rashid (2017), in their publication “Diversity doesn‟t stick without inclusion”, offer an 
insightful explanation of the missing link and why studies on board diversity have failed to consistently demonstrate its 
presumed benefits, even among corporations that have yielded to societal and regulatory pressures. They argue that social 
inclusion (which defines the terms on which individuals in teams work together) is a strong moderator in the relationship 
between diversity and board effectiveness and performance. Riordan (2020) asserts that it is erroneous to assume that 
diversity presupposes inclusion. Unless outside directors who join corporate boards feel secure and accepted, their 
involvement amounts to little more than to window dressing and is less impactful. Simply adding female directors and 
those with relevant industry knowledge to corporate boards does not guarantee vigilance and effectiveness. This is 
because their contributions are limited by their level of participation and the extent to which their thoughts are valued and 
respected in board deliberations. If the concerned corporations diversified only in the interest of compliance with statutory 
requirements or adherence to societal demands as prudent business operators, their board diversification would not likely 
engender social inclusiveness between in-group and out-group board members. Therefore, delimiting the elements that 
adequately define social inclusion in research model specifications is crucial in valid empirical testing of the value of 
board diversity in corporate governance research.  
In conclusion, our deduction from prior equivocal results is simple: Having diverse membership representation along 
demographic and cognitive dimensions may actually have benefits and underlying costs, with the former even likely to 
overweigh the latter; however, the weight distribution may vary significantly based on prevailing conditions and the 
general circumstances driving such configurations. Corporations must, thus, dig deep, beyond compliance with a quota 
system and the application of code recommendations, to gain a better understanding of what works best for individual 
entities, given their distinctive peculiarities, such as competitive position, market shares, industry classification, and 
macroeconomic realities. The adoption of forced diversification, such as a compulsory gender quota system and industry 
expertise, may be injurious to corporations (Riordan, 2020; Sherbin & Rashid, 2017). Nevertheless, finding the optimal 
form of diversity will enable corporations to avoid bandwagon effects and tokenism syndrome. Tokenism and social 
inclusion are discussed in detail in the next section. Finally, a consistent difficulty found in the literature review is 
selecting which aspect of diversity (i.e. quality or quality) should take precedent is still a major blind post in discussions of 
board diversity. Most debates have focused on numeric diversity as contrastive to competence and negatively correlated 
with the size of the contribution directors are likely to make (Fairfax, 2005; Kim & Lim, 2010). The calls for increased 
minority participation and gender parity are both numerically driven. However, beyond racial and gender delineation, 
competence and expertise are dynamic fundamentals when it comes to board workings and oversight. Therefore, the 
sticky point for corporations is determining the appropriate lead spindle between business rationale and societal 
expectations (Rhode & Packel, 2014). 
4. Tokenism in Board Diversity: A Case for Social Inclusion and a Portfolio Efficiency Approach  
Without a doubt, diversity has received commendable attention in corporate governance, given the volume of research. 
From institutional and societal perspectives, pressure on corporations has been equally overwhelming. However, the 
preceding section highlighted how polarised the research remains with regards to inconsistency in findings. Some 
previous studies even suggest the need for an alternative theoretical framework for studying the relevance of board 
diversity in firm governance and corporate performance (Nielsen & Huse, 2010). In this section, two new conceptual 
frameworks for empirical testing are proposed, and it is demonstrated how they can be used in board diversity research. 
Applied Finance and Accounting                                          Vol. 7, No. 1; 2021 
26 
The paper argues that resolving the pervasive research equivocality would require addressing the drawbacks of 
tokenism by advocating for social inclusion and the prevention of board overcrowding for effective oversight. Board 
diversity provides corporations with social capital due to the multiplicity of network connections that individuals from 
diverse backgrounds bring to bear, representing a vital source of resource dependency for corporations. Despite being 
an essential dynamic, the approach and extent to which boards of directors are diversified should be consistent with 
corporate goals (Slater et al., 2008) and firm-specific characteristics, such as ownership structure (Ben-Amar, Francoeur, 
Hafsi, & Labelle, 2013); reputation and innovation (Miller & Triana, 2009); role expectations (Nielsen & Huse, 2010); 
industry classification (Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Zhang, 2019); and degree of internationalisation (Rivas, 2012). So far, 
the introduction of diversity quota regulations has created misalignment and has done more harm than good in corporate 
board diversity, especially from an implementation standpoint. Basically, it is now a case of forcing horses to the stream 
but not being able to force them to drink. While there is increased compliance with diversity regulations in certain 
jurisdictions, the level of commitment demonstrated by corporations in making it work varies significantly (see 
Ciavarella, 2017; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Fitzsimmons, 2012; Ng & Wyrick, 2011; Pathan & Faff, 2013; Sila, Gonzalez, 
& Hagendorff, 2016; Slater et al., 2008). Rhode and Packel (2014) argue that although significant progress has been 
made toward the entrenchment of diversity at the corporate board level, the lack of inclusion has impeded and 
deaccelerated the pace of progress. 
As highlighted in the previous section, there is a clear distinction between diversity and inclusion. While diversity 
focuses on numeric attributes, such as the number of individuals from different demographic and cognitive 
configurations, inclusion is a process that ensures seamless integration and makes their presence really count 
(Henderson, 2014; Winters, 2014). To this end, while diversity can be legislated, inclusion is a soft skill attribute that is 
difficult to appraise, and thus perhaps more difficult to achieve than diversity. Structurally, corporations may externally 
adhere to board diversity regulations and yet refuse to make the necessary internal support changes that would create an 
enabling environment for success. This is an example of “tokenism”, or diversity without inclusion. Tokenism 
represents the prospect of having a superficially diverse board in terms of demographic and cognitive parity without 
substantial internal drive to make it work as intended.  
Diversity can be costly if adopted for tokenism. Slater et al. (2008) argue that the cosmetic adoption of diversity without 
due consideration of the inherent corporate culture is likely to hurt shareholders‟ earnings due to high costs. The cost of 
forced board diversity includes potential loss of cohesion due to lack of trust among members, sacrifice of competence 
for compliance, passive boards and groupthink syndrome due to overcrowding (Rhode & Packel, 2014). Harjotoa et al. 
(2018) argue that directors with the required cognitive competencies are more likely to exhibit prejudice toward 
colleagues appointed on a quota-based system. Therefore, aside from the increased cost of governance, board 
performance can be impaired by the extent to which in-group and standing directors believe new directors merit the 
appointments that bring them onto the board. Should the in-group members have a sense that new entrant appointments 
are based purely on compliance with governance code or fulfilment of equality requirements, this will affect their 
openness and limit cohesiveness among board members. Lauring and Villeseche (2017), in their study of diversity and 
team attitude, affirm the above position, as they found a strong correlation between members‟ positive attitudes toward 
diversity and overall team performance. For new directors to function effectively in the boardroom, they need to be 
appropriately integrated and socially accepted by the in-group members.  
It is interesting to note that the supposed benefits of diversity are basic presumptions that can only be realised with 
inclusion. What matters in diversity is not the variety of people but rather an enabling environment created to foster 
pragmatic collaboration and allow directors to showcase their inherent talent in helping corporations attain 
predetermined goals (Slater et al., 2008). Winter (2014) argues that diversity is just a “noun”, but inclusion is the action 
word that makes the diversity really count. The effectiveness of board diversity as a corporate action is largely 
dependent upon whether it has enterprise-wide acceptability and commitment. For empirical testing, commitment to 
diversity can be measured using the Inclusion Equation (Winter, 2014). This model depicts key characteristics (macro 
and micro) of sustainable corporate inclusion. To explain and adapt the said model, we hypothesise, board diversity (i.e. 
demographic and cognitive) should be collectively recognised in both numeric and qualitative terms. Doing so would 
ensure that the study sample covered the characteristics of directors and the aspects of corporate commitment that are 
consistent with the exact definition of and principles behind board heterogeneity (i.e. Diversity + Inclusion). Following 
this recognition mechanism would automatically eliminate tokenism-diversified boards from the sample. This approach 
would also assist policymakers and corporate regulators in monitoring compliance and in factually differentiating 
between active and passive (tokenism-based) board diversity among corporations. The model in (i) illustrates our 
definition of board diversity for empirical testing. 
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Board diversity = ƒ (Diversity) + 
(Inclusion)………………………………………………………………………..(i). 
Figure 1. The model in (i) illustrates our definition of board diversity for empirical testing. 
Diversity represents several demographic and cognitive dimensions of directors (including, but not limited to, age, race, 
gender, ethnicity, nationality, experience, education and expertise), in line with most definitions in previous studies 
(Theodorakopoulos & Budhwar, 2015). After measuring diversity, the next step would be to check for inclusiveness, 
that is, whether, beyond diversity head counts, the affected directors are fully integrated into the corporations and 
boardrooms and have been provided an enabling atmosphere in which they can excel. Simulating by using an abridged 
Winter‟s Inclusion Equation, corporations would be scored across three visible dimension indices: shared values, 
structured inclusive systems, and cultural-cognitive competence. The existence of functional corporate shared values 
and whether those values support diversity and inclusion are captured in phrases used in the corporate vision and 
strategy statements. Identifying and measuring the shared values dimension would ascertain the degree to which 
diversity and inclusion culture are imbedded corporate-wide.  
The second inclusion dimension measures corporate level of preparedness and maturity. Unlike diversity, corporate 
inclusiveness entails building a formal corporate structure and introducing corporate policies, procedures and practices 
that stimulate, support, recognise and respect diverse viewpoints. Corporations would thus be scored on whether they 
have formal systems and programmes in place that promote corporate inclusion. These might include dedicated 
diversity departments, on-boarding and buddy programmes for new entrants, and anti-discrimination and equal 
opportunity policy.  
The third and final dimension measures the enterprise-wide level of cultural competence. Cultural-cognitive 
competence can be measured in two tiers. The first focuses on the level of leadership involvement and the tone at the 
top regarding driving inclusion. This would involve having diversity and inclusion as part of deliverables in corporate 
scorecards and executive performance contracts. The second part would measure corporate cultural awareness and 
cultural competency-building initiatives (such as training programmes and workshops), as well as whether corporations 
have shared values and inclusion network support groups where members share experiences and learn from each other 
(Slater et al., 2008).  
Beyond social inclusion, another aspect of tokenism is the determination of the ideal level of board diversity and the 
prevention of board overcrowding. Societal pressure on corporations for increased demographic representation has both 
value-based and symbolic implications (Dalton & Dalton, 2010; Farrell & Hersch, 2005). If diversity enhances the 
social capital of the board, it is common sense that the addition of diverse directors would only but boost its ability to 
tap into larger networks in times of pressing need. However, it is also critical that corporations establish that peak point 
of diversity value, as any addition of diverse directors beyond this may reduce utility (Pathan & Faff, 2013). This is why 
critics believe that legislating board diversity may engender overdiversification, or having too many heterogeneous 
directors than are rationally needed (Bernilea et al., 2018; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Gary & Nowland, 2017). Zhang 
(2012) finds that board diversity is significantly linked to technical weakness, which reinforces the deduction that 
coercive diversity can be detrimental.  
To address this innate weakness, we further hypothesise that the adoption of a “efficient frontier” portfolio model will 
help determine the most efficient level of board diversity to maintain a given corporation‟s inherent characteristics and 
business fundamentals. The efficient frontier model in portfolio theory provides a compelling methodology for 
understanding board diversity and a mechanism for achieving optimal diversity across demographic and cognitive 
dimensions. The theoretical argument of portfolio theory aligns with the key arguments researchers have put forward in 
testing the empirical validity of claims regarding board diversity. The model states that the “risk and reruns of an 
investment in a given security should not be assessed as standalone but rather evaluated in the context how its affect risk 
and return of the entire portfolio” (Markowitz, 1952). Applying this theoretical description to board dynamics, we 
theorise that the relationship between board diversity (i.e. demographic and cognitive) and performance should be 
assessed within the context of the social inclusion of the diversified members of the board.  
Corporate boards represent a portfolio of directors as securities, and just as in any portfolio, efficiency is always 
dependent not only upon the number and quality of securities that make up the portfolio, but also the degree of 
sensitivity (i.e. inclusion) of each security within the given portfolio. Borrowing from portfolio theory, which sought to 
find optimal level of diversification along an “efficient frontier”, we assume that the selection of directors on a 
corporate board should be based on multiple indicators that determine how efficiently they can fit into the board setting 
in terms of their ability to interact with other board members (i.e. social capital). In other words, more attention should 
be paid to the collectivism of board as a unit rather than having an excessively skewed focus on demographic and 
cognitive configurations, which only highlights individuals‟ qualities against those of the group (Farndale et al., 2015).  
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Markowitz (1952) argues that having a diversified portfolio does not guarantee reduced volatility in the performance of 
securities therein. Consistently, board diversity alone, in terms of having different directors from varying demographic 
and cognitive denominations, is not sufficient to drive board performance; however, with an effective inclusion system, 
directors are more likely to work together and hence lessen the volatility associated with their diversity.  
Researchers can construct a diversity verification index that seeks to achieve optimal diversification and determines 
corporations‟ position in the diversification efficiency frontier. The blend of indices used should cut across both 
demographic and cognitive indicators, with elements of social inclusion, as enumerated in the abridged inclusion 
equation discussed earlier in this section. An efficient frontier barometer would indicate whether a corporation is 
operating with efficient diversity (optimal and cost-effective) or a sub-optimally diversified board (tokenism based). For 
instance, corporations with board diversity scores on the upper level of the curve are assumed to be efficient, while 
those that fall outside the efficient frontier curve are regarded as inefficient in terms of board diversity because the cost 
of such diversity would most likely outweigh its probable benefits.  
5. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research  
Diversity in the corporate workforce is a valid paradigm for any prudent corporation operating in the modern and 
constantly evolving business environment. Drawing upon lessons from the corporate scandals of the last two decades, 
there is equally compelling evidence to support the growing call for diversity at top corporate levels, especially boards 
of directors. Diversity means that board members are from different backgrounds and are thus likely to think differently 
and offer diverse perspectives and ideas to aid in strategic corporate decision making. Therefore, membership diversity 
is critical in helping executives to unlock the opportunities that abound in the global marketplace through quality 
advisory and beneficial external networks.  
However, this study differs in its recommended mechanism for achieving board diversity, specifically with regards to 
the adoption of quota systems, which are found to be impulsive, deficient and simplistic, giving the impression that 
diversity is a less complex process. Board diversity should be promoted in an integrated and flexible fashion and not 
necessarily through stringent codification and regulatory point-based systems. Researchers have struggled to clearly 
justify the need for board diversity, not because it is not beneficial, but due to the rigidity of the process in some 
jurisdictions (e.g. Spain, Italy, Norway and France), where corporations are not only forced to diversify their boards but 
are also given a predetermined ratio of how membership diversity should look. Apart from the inherent risk of CEO 
entrenchment, legislating board diversity promotes tokenism because corporations still reserve discretion to make it 
work through the deliberate institutionalisation of social inclusion and integration programmes (Bernilea et al., 2018; 
Slater et al., 2008). Prior studies after the implementation of a quota system still find it hard to empirically prove that such 
regulatory measures helped the corporations involved in terms of improved board and corporate performance. Those that 
find positive results attribute this to external environmental influences, mainly government incentives, rather than to 
diversity legislation.  
We believe that diversity as a concept encapsulates two dynamics – “variety” and “inclusion” – but these dynamics have 
either been grossly misunderstood or wrongly applied in most previous corporate governance studies. Diversity without 
inclusion rarely works. While the former is a numerically based dimension that can easily be legislated, the latter 
represents soft skill mechanics that cannot be adequately legislated or enforced. Even though inclusion is a key element 
that enhances directors‟ task performance in the boardroom, most prior studies adopt a numeric definition, without 
accounting for inclusion. These parochial and paradoxical definitions, we believe, have fuelled the equivocality that has 
distorted empirical findings from both conceptual and methodological standpoints. For instance, the assumption of a 
linear relationship is a flawed model specification for diversity research simply because diversity can only endure 
effectively in an inclusive corporate setting. 
In conclusion, this paper has offered two sets of recommendations, one focusing on regulatory and internal frameworks 
for board diversity, and the other offering a guide for future research. From a regulatory perspective, we recommend 
that directorship appointments should be devoid of coercion and corporations themselves should create an environment 
that promotes inclusiveness to aid board diversity, irrespective of whether it is demographic or cognitive based. Board 
members‟ mindset is equally vital in achieving inclusive diversity at the board level. In-group board members 
themselves need to embrace the new reality of heterogeneity, which would be characterised by having people from 
different backgrounds and walks of life all contributing to the achievement of common corporate goals.  
As for future research, we recommend that researchers approach board diversity from a fresh and more pragmatic 
perspective. More precisely, this study calls for a significant paradigm shift on two aspects of diversity research. First, 
future studies need to move away from an excessive focus on demographics and toward a combination of both 
dimensions (i.e. demographic and cognitive). Second, in the data sample selection process, forced and legislated 
diversity boards must be recognised as outliers, with further investigation to determine the presence or lack of social 
inclusion and integration and the degree of cohesion among board members. Third, corporate governance research 
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needs to evolve and be more adventurous, especially in cross-field applications of knowledge and in drawing up 
conceptual frameworks and models for research. For instance, this paper demonstrated how a corporate finance model 
(i.e. “efficiency frontier”) can be used during the preliminary data testing stage to determine the efficiency level of 
directors‟ diversity in corporate board performance. This is the kind of originality that is likely to help resolve some of 
the unanswered puzzles of board dynamics in firm governance. Finally, we strongly encourage the investigative testing 
of the methodologies proposed in this paper to empirically validate their efficacy and suitability.  
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